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ABSTRACT 
Reeves and Sinnicks present Theodor Adorno as a philosopher with a 
sombre message to business ethics. Capitalist markets distort our needs 
and work in business organisations stultifies our moral capacities. Thus, 
the discipline's self-understanding must be revised, and  s u p p l e m e n t e d 
with reflections on what would be good work: free creative activity. After 
raising some questions about their interpretation of Adorno's writings on 
human needs, I argue that the paper does not contain all the necessary 
resources to support its ferociously critical claims. Once such resources 
are made available, however, the appeal to a notion of good work is no 
longer viable. 
BUSINESS ETHICS TYPICALLY asks questions about how to ethically 
evaluate the behaviour of companies and the conduct of their key per-
sonnel. Frankfurt School critical theory asks questions about how, in 
light of the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century, we 
are to understand the manner in which capitalist market societies 
organise the satisfaction of needs. Reeves and Sinnicks (2021) provide 
a timely contribution by introducing Theodor Adorno's thought as 
relevant to the intersection of these questions. The paper can be sum-
marised as follows: 
 Email: j.nevasto@outlook.com1
____________________________________________ 
Discuss this commentary at https://wp.me/p2x7zx-sA
Cite as: Bus Ethics J Rev 9(7): 40–46, 
https://doi.org/10.12747/j1i07   
Edited by Chris MacDonald & Alexei Marcoux 
ISSN: 2326-7526 
Nevasto on Reeves and Sinnicks
a) capitalist economic activity as exchange and profit oriented prevents 
human beings from expressing their genuine needs.  
b) this follows from an adaptive orientation to functional roles. 
c) as an upshot our social worlds are devoid of the kind of moral orien-
tation business ethics presupposes.  
d) despite these obstacles, we can reorient the discipline by gleaning from 
Adorno that “good work”, work appropriate to free human beings, 
resembles philosophical and artistic activity. 
This commentary is a sympathetic but critical examination of three as-
pects of this paper. I wish to amplify the importance of Adorno's debt 
to Marx with respect to the notion of human needs (section 1). I then 
suggest that Adorno's moral epistemological argument about the anti-
nomical character of moral philosophy should be spelled out (section 
2). Finally, I argue that the position of Reeves and Sinnicks contains a 
methodological tension between critical theory and moral philosophy 
as it is typically understood (section 3). Bringing these three points to 
the surface supports the relevance of Adorno's thought to new direc-
tions in business ethics (section 4). 
1. 
According to Reeves and Sinnicks (2021: 4), Adorno is a fierce critic 
of capitalist societies, chiefly their mode of commodity production. 
Far from meeting human needs directly and with intent, capitalist 
commodity production does so accidentally: “what happens to be 
profitable has no intrinsic connection with people's needs because 
consumptive wants have proved themselves to be susceptible to mani-
pulation and manufacture.” From the profit driven character of the 
system follow that our needs are “false”, “wrong”, “inverted”, with 
the qualification that “. . . in adapting themselves to an inhospitable 
social world, they prevent themselves from being what they really are 
themselves, from encountering their real needs and interests” (Reeves 
and Sinnicks 2021: 9). 
The paper's discussion of human needs calls for clarification 
because the notion of false needs is commonly associated with the 
work of Herbert Marcuse, and the wires may here be somewhat 
crossed. The latter's critique of consumerism holds that we obtain 
most of our needs only because of the heteronomous interests their 
satisfaction serves. Satisfying such “false” needs, which Marcuse 
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(2013: 7–8) thinks we can identify empirically, represses our “true” 
autonomously acquired needs. In contrast, Adorno (2017: 103) denies 
precisely a polar distinction between true and false needs: “No neat 
distinction can be made between a need proper to humanity and one 
that would be a consequence of repression” and further still that all 
existing “needs are conglomerates of truth and falsehood” (Adorno 
1973: 93). 
Centrally, to Adorno need satisfaction within capitalism is anta-
gonistic, in the sense that it is both “true” and “false”. The closeness 
of these ideas, as suggested by Reeves and Sinnicks (2021: 3–6), with 
Marx's notion of “socially necessary illusion” is key to understanding 
this. Accordingly, capitalist production processes are necessarily ab-
straction generating: use-values have to be fitted into a category 
qualitatively alien to them, monetary exchange value. The capitalist 
form of exchange produces illusions about itself because it serves the 
drive of capital to self-reproduce via something qualitatively different 
to it: needs and the labour of wage workers. Needs and labour are 
simultaneously the engines of the capitalist economy, and yet neces-
sarily subservient to it. Marx and Adorno articulate theoretically what 
successful business people will know instinctively: the weight of the 
objective economic reality demands canonising both the use-values of 
products as well as the conditions of the labour force so that they 
accommodate the latest developments in scientific processes and the 
finance-markets. 
Centrally, and at odds with standard Marxian business ethics 
(Corlett 2013; Shaw 2009), Adorno's theory is not predicated on the 
notions that profits are morally unjust or that business actors are gree-
dy. Rather, it has systemic implications which are salient to the very 
possibility of moral thought and action. 
2. 
Reeves and Sinnicks (2021: 1–2) follow Adorno's assertions to the 
effect that the modern capitalist world is “radically evil” and “our so-
cieties and their basic institutions are fundamentally bad”. On these 
lines, it is argued that Adorno's thought challenges business ethics’ 
and management's self-understanding. In substantiating these points, 
Reeves and Sinnicks (2021: 8–11) focus on Adorno’s socio-psy-
chological claims. Indeed, one benefits from the discussion of social 
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roles and the psychological disintegration they arguably precipitate. 
Adorno, on their interpretation, emphasises “the freedom undermining 
effect of the social pressure to adapt and identify with employment 
roles” (Reeves and Sinnicks 2021: 11). 
I expect many working in business ethics scholarship may ap-
preciate these points but still wonder how the moral adjective “evil” 
can apply to societies in their entirety, or why these problems pose a 
fundamental challenge to business ethics. Here Reeves and Sinnicks 
are short of philosophical resources, and we can clarify this issue by 
distinguishing between a moral epistemological and a sociological ar-
gument which run side by side in Adorno’s writings. 
The first is a Nietzsche and Freud inspired objection to Kant's no-
tion of moral agency. Very briefly, conceptual reflection on a moral 
principle cannot by itself result to action unless it is mediated by moti-
vating impulses, but the latter – contra Kant – have to be more than 
formless raw material for cognition (Adorno 1973: 221–223). Their 
substance matters for morality. Moral “knowledge” through impulses, 
as also Hegelians and virtue ethicists think, is a shared, circular 
achievement. A moral agent has the capacity to acquire it, but moral 
capacity cannot emerge unless one lives among other such agents 
within institutions such as families and workplaces which enable its 
ongoing nurturing. 
Adorno's critique of moral philosophy's possibility (and thus 
business ethics' possibility) draws the implications of this moral epi-
stemological argument in light of already introduced sociological one 
about the structural demands imposed on agents. Self-preservation in 
an economic sense enforces the opposite of moral impulses: a calcu-
lative and strategic orientation in any area markets and economic-
administrative systems penetrate. Even if impulses such as empathy 
survive this, the lack of control individuals and organisations have of 
the social conditions of moral action typically render it void. There-
fore, a Hegelian or communitarian alternative to Kantianism will not 
secure moral agency. We face an aporia: reflection on moral principles 
is empty without situated moral knowledge, but the structures of in-
stitutions deprive us its acquisition and application. 
Adorno's assertion that the world is on the whole “bad” or “evil” 
can be understood as the claim that the kinds of experiences morality 
depends upon, as suggested by the canonical representatives of the 
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philosophical tradition, are undermined by the basic principles of cap-
italist social organisation. The trouble with standard moral philosophy 
– and business ethics – is that it cannot even consider this as a pos-
sibility, and thus rides roughshod over the deeper question about its 
own intelligibility, “namely the question whether culture, and what 
has become of culture, permits something like the good life” (Adorno 
2000: 14). 
3. 
The reconstructive element of Reeves and Sinnicks’s (2021: 2) paper 
involves a sketch “on the nature and the possibility of the best kind of 
work for human beings”. They write, 
Forms of genuine activity are marked by their relative freedom from the 
reifying forces of exchange society, whereby they approximate kinds of 
genuine experience that comes close to fulfilling genuine needs for 
creative activity and granting genuinely autonomous experience, even if 
the wider context ensures they will fall some way short of this telos 
(Reeves and Sinnicks 2021: 17). 
In particular, “philosophical and artistic activity are something like 
paradigms of good work” (Reeves and Sinnicks 2021: 18), whereas 
monotonous performative work and especially management roles are 
examples of alienated work. Such ideas act as the critical fork against 
which reality is held to an account: “Adorno's critique appraises 
modern work from the unrestricted standpoint of the potential for 
human flourishing” (Reeves and Sinnicks 2021: 19). 
At this juncture the argument does not, methodologically speak-
ing, proceed as a critical theory,  but as moral philosophy which 2
understands its activity as assessing the world in light of a normative 
ontology, rather close to the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre (2008). 
However, keeping in mind the paper's indictment of our capitalist 
social institutions as radically evil, this gesturing towards a quasi-
Aristotelian notion of genuine activity as an evaluative standpoint 
generates, prima facie, a dilemma. If capitalism is merely “some way 
short” of the genuine human form, it does not sound all that radical, or 
evil (Reeves and Sinnicks 2021: 17). And if we maintain the radical 
evil thesis, the restriction of it to cover only performative work and 
management – but not philosophy and art – is an arbitrary one. Clari-
 On the distinction between “traditional” and “critical” theories, see Horkheimer (1972).2
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fication with respect to the notion of “relative freedom” from social 
dynamics, as well as disambiguation between the “good”, the “genu-
ine”, and the “best” types of work would be helpful. 
4. 
In conclusion, Reeves's and Sinnicks's reconstructive claims about the 
best kind of work can perhaps be understood as an additional per-
spective, which is strictly speaking not required for the appreciation of 
the paper's other elements. From these we can draw resources for a 
renewed business ethics as an explanatory critique of the conditions 
which render business ethics (under its traditional self-conception) 
ineffective. Consider in this context that “a systemic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics”  has been identified as one of the drivers of 
the 2008 economic crash (Angelides, et al 2010). In this sense, an ef-
fective moral critique leads to the critique of the conditions in which 
morality has collapsed. 
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